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T
Judicial Misconduct During Jury
Deliberations
By Bennett L. Gershman *
The author considers the two principal types of improper judicial
behavior that may occur during the jury deliberation process.
Judicial conduct that attempts to place undue pressure on a jury to
reach a verdict may include verdict-urging instructions, threats and
intimidation, and inquiry into the numerical division of the jury on
the merits of the verdict. Judicial participation in private, ex parte
communications with jurors may also subvert orderly trial procedure
and undermine the impartiality of the jury. Neither kind of judicial
conduct may be allowed to compel a verdict from a jury.

.,

.J

The relationship between judge and jury is never more intense
than during the jury deliberation process. During this period, the
judge exerts considerable influence over the jury, and he must
use that influence prudently and sensitively. The judge ministers
to the jury's personal needs, controls the deliberation schedule,
facilitates review of evidence, answers jury questions about
legal and factual issues , reiterates legal instructions, investigates
allegations of irregularities, and determines the overall pace and
extent of deliberations. In exercising these functions, the judge
must strive to maintain a delicate balance between affording the
jury sufficient autonomy to reach conscientiously no decision
and at the same time urge the jury without improper pressure to
reach a fair and an impartial verdict. This tension between the
interest in conscientious disagreement and the interest in a verdict
makes the jury deliberation process a fertile setting for judicial
misconduct.
Two principal kinds of improper judicial behavior can occur
during this process: first, judicial conduct that attempts to place
undue pressure on a jury to reach a verdict, and second, judicial
particip'ltion in private, ex parte communications with jurors.
Each of these topics is discussed below.
Coercing a Verdict
Verdict-Urging Instructions

[
t

"The very object of the jury system," the United States
Supreme Court wrote in Allen v. United States, "is to secure

* Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law.
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unanimity by a comparison of views , and by argument among
the jurors themselves. " I There is no requirement, however, that
a jury agree. A hung jury is a legitimate end of atrial. 2 This
inherent tension between encouraging legitimate agreement while
not discouraging principled dissent has been at the ro t f the
controversy over the degree of pressure that a judge may employ
in urging a deadlocked jury to reach an agreement. 3 The socalled Allen charge, from the decision bearing that name, has
been the subject of considerable debate since the case was decided
nearly 100 years ago. 4 Known variously as the "dynamite"
1 Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492. 501 ( 189 ). There is n
bligation on the
parl of a judge to give any special instru 'lion when a jury reports disagreement.
The judge may simp ly elect to declare a mistrial. Uniled States v. S e, 505 P.2d
845 (9th Cir. 1974 eert. denied , 420 U.S. 992 (1975). There may be doublejeopardy oneems, however iJl discharging premallHely a deliberatingjury. United
State, v. Lansdown, 460 F .2d 164 (4lh Cir. 1972) (discharge of jury after it had
deliberated for eleven hours without attempting I determine whether it could rea h
a verdict prevented retrial on double-jeopardy grounds) .
. The hung jury has been cJull'<:lcterized as "the jury system's most interesting
ph nom non . 1.n one sense it marks a rHilure of the system, since it n cessari ly
bring a de laration of a mistrial in its wake. In another sense, it is a valued a' 'IUaJlce
of integrity, since it Clin serve to protect th diss nl f a minority . " H. Kalven & H.
Zeisel, the Americ(lIIJury 453 ( 1966). See Arizona v. Washingt n 434 U.S. 497 ,
509 (1978 (defendant's ri ·ht to have trial completed by particular jury must be
weighed against defendant ', right to c nsidered judgment 01' all jurors, rather than a
judgment resulting from pressures of 'protracted and exhau ling" d liberati n ')'
Huffman v. Uilited States, 297 F.2d 754 759 (5111. Cil'.) (Brow n, J. . dissenting
C"lthink a misu'ial from a hung jury is a safeguard to liherty . In Illany area' it is the
ole means by which one or a few may tand out against an verwhelming
contemp rary public sentiment. Nothing should interfere with it exercise' '), eerr.
denied , 370 U.S. 955 ( 1962 ; State V. Flint, 114 Idaho 806, 761 P.2 1 1158 , 11 64
( L988 ("the hungjllry is n t ajurisprudemial failure, but ral11er is a commendation
n 111e fail' and evenhanded administration of justice' . In tileir classic studY, The
American Jury, Professors Kalven and Zeisel found l1,at more thaJl 5 percent of all
juries end in a mistrial. H. Kalven & H. Zeisel , supra.
It should be noted thai many jurisdicUons do not require unanimity in civil cases,
and five tates permit a convic tion on Jess than a unanimous verdict. H. Kalven &
H. Zeisel, supra, at 461 n.6. Moreover, ajury may be authorized to return a partial
verdict on one or more defendants or one or more offenses. N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law
§ 310.70 (McKinney 1988). A judge may ask Ihe jury to render such a partial
verdict and then resume deliberations on the remaining defendants and charges. See
United States V. Bascaro, 742 F.2d 1335 (l l th Cir. 1984) ; Morgan V. Uniled States,
380 F.2d 686 (9th Cil'. 1967), cert. denied, 390 V.S. 962 ( L968). A judge ' hould
be careful, however, not to suggest that the jury compromi e its consc ienliou, ly
held beliefs for the sake of expediency. United States V. Smoot, 463 F. 2d 122 1
(D.C. Cif. 1972).
-' Every federal appellate court, and virtually every state jurisdiction, uses some
form of a supplemental jury charge. See Lowenfield V. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 238
n.l (1988). Note, "Deadlocked Juries and the Allen Charge," 37 Me. L. Rev. 167
(1985).
United States v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396
4
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charge,5 the "nitroglycerin" charge, 6 the" shotgun" instruction ,7
and the' 'third-degree" instruction ,8 the Allen charge is a supplemental instruction that, in essence, admonishes a deadlocked
jury to (1) decide the case if it can~ conscientiously do so; (2)
give deference to the views of other jurors with the objective of
being convinced, and (3) urge minority jurors to reconsider
the reasonableness of their convictions. The Supreme Court
described the instructions as follows:

..

o

These instructions were quite lengthy, and were, in substance, that in a
large proportion of cases, absolute certainty could not be expected; that,
although the verdict must be the verdict of each individual juror, and
not a mere acquiescence in the conclusion of his fellows, yet they should
examine the question submitted with candor, and with a proper regard
and deference to the opinions of each other; that it was their duty to
decide the case if they could conscientiously do so; that they should
listen, with a disposition to be convinced, to each other's arguments;
that, if much the larger number were for conviction, a dissenting juror
should consider whether his doubt was a reasonable one which made no
impression upon the minds of so many men, equally honest, equally
intelligent with himself. If, upon the other hand, the majority were for
acquittal, the minority ought to ask themselves whether they might not
reasonably doubt the correctness of a judgment which was not concurred
in by the majority. 9
U.S . 837 (Allen harge un unwarranted judi inl n r achmenL of xclusivc province
oflhejury) ' United SUItes v. Thoma, 449 F.2d 1177, 1184n.45, 1187 (D.C. Cir.
1971) (en banc) (rejecLing Allen charge as unduly co rci ve); United StaLes v. Brown,
41 I F.2d 930 (7th ir, 1969) , en. denied, 396 U.S. 1017 (1970) ; Pields v. State,
487 P.2d 831, 840 (Alaska 1971) (Allen charge' less an object ofcoffimcndation
than toleration"); State v. Randall, 137 Mont. 534, 353 P.2d 1054 (1960) (rejecting
Allen charge); State v. Thomas, 86 Ariz. 161, 342 P.2d 197 (1959) same). See
also Note, "On Instructing Deadlocked Juries," 78 Yale LJ. 100 (1968) ; Note.
"Due Process, Judicial Economy, and the Hung Jury: A Reexamination of lheAl/en
Charge," 53 Va. L. Rev. (1967); Comment, "Deadlocked Juries and Dynamite: A
Critical Look at the "Allen Charge," 31 U. Chi. L. Rev. 386 (1964). See also
Annotation, "Instructions Urging Dissenting Jurors in State Criminal Cases to Give
Due Consideration to Opinion of Majority (Allen Charge)-Modern Cases," 97
A.L.R.3d 96 (1980); Annotation, "Verdict-Urging Instructions in Civil Case
Stressing Desirability and Importance of Agreement," 38 A.L.R.3d 1281 (1971),
5 Green v. United States, 309 F.2d 852,853 (,5th Cir. 1962).
6 Huffman v. United States, 297 F.2d 754,759 (5th Cir.) (Brown, J., concurring
and dissenting), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 955 (1962).
7 State v. Nelson, 63 N.M. 428, 431,321 P.2d 202,204 (1958).
8 Leechv. People 112
10. 120, 123. 146 P .2d 346 47(l944).Allenhasalso
been described as "a sharp punch to the jury , reminding Lhem of the nature of their
dUlY and the Lime and expen 'e or a trial , and urging lhem to try again to reach a
verdict" United States v. Anderton, 679 F.2d 1199, 1203 (5th Cir. 1982).
9 Allen, 164 U.S. at 501.
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Embellishments of the Allen charge have elicited tolerant as well
as intolerant responses by the courts. These additions have
included reminding jurors of the expense and inconvenience of a
retrial lO or that the case would have to be retried by another jury,
should the present jury fail to reach a verdict. II
The principal concern over the Allen charge is that it pressures
minority jurors to surrender their principles by giving them the
impression that the judge agree with the maj rity viewpoint and
by threatening continued c nfinement until a verdict is reached. 12
Recognition that other jurors must remain confined because of a
minority juror' individual beliefs necessarily produces strong
pressmes to reach agreement that often have little to do with the
merits of the case. Moreover, some critics ask whether the
purported societal gains in fewer retrials as a result of the Allen
charge are offset by the appellate complications in determining
whether the trial judge gave a correct charge at the correct point
in time during the deliberations. 13
Although the Allen charge or some similar variation continues
to be an accepted instruction in many jurisdictions,'4 several
federal '5 and state l6 appellate courts, pursuant to their supervisory
10 United States v. Smith, 303 F.2d 34 1 (4th Cir. 1962); State v. Flint, 11 4 idaho
806,761 P.2d 1158 (1988 ; Golden v. FirslCilY Nal ' l Bank, 75 1 S.W.2d 639 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1988); Vanderbilt Univ . v. Steely 566 S.W.2d 853 (Tenn. 1978).
II United State v. Porrer 88 1 F .2d 878 (10th Cir.), cerl. denied, 110 S.
t. 348
( 1989) ' United States v. Smith , 857 F.2d 682 ( 10th Cir. 1988); Hodge' v. United
States , 408 F .2d 543 (8th Cir. 1969).
I? Such an instructi n can have an even more del terious e ffect wben tbe identity
of tbe recalcitrant jurors is known and they are, in effect, singled out. See Indiana
State Highway Comm'n v. Vanderbur, 432 N.E.2d 4L8 (lnd. Ct. App. 1982).
1 Andrew ' v. United States, 309 F.2d L27 (5th Cir. 1962) cert. denied, 372
U.S. 946 (1963 (Wisdom. J. dissenling) ("[ALlen s] time-saving merits io the
district court are more than nullified by the complications it. caus S 0 appeal when
the reviewing court must determine whether in the circumstances of a particular
case the trial judge applied the charg properly- in substance and timing ' ).
14 The Suprem Counrecently reaffirmed the principles underlyingAlIell. Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 23 1 237 (1988) C"[tJhe conti nuing validity of this Court s
ob ervati os in AI/en are beyond dispute " ). See Kawakita v. nited States, 343
U.S. 7] 7 (1952) (Allen churge a sumed to be appropriate instruction to deadlocked
juries). See also Note, note supra.
I ~ Several circuit courts have indicated djsapproval r its u ·e. See United States
v. Thomas 449 F.2d 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1971 ). United Slates v. Fi ravanti. 4~2 F.2d
407 (3d Cir.), cerl. denied 396 V .S. 837 1969); UnHed States v. Brown, 411 F.2d
930 (7th Cir. 1969), cen. denied, 396 V.S. 10 17 (1970) .
16 Several states have banned the Allert charge. See State v. Flinl, 11 4 Idaho 806,
761 P.2d 115 (1988) People v. Gain .r, .19 Cal. d 835 , 566 P.2d 997 , 139 Ca1.
Rptr . 861 (1977); Stare v. Thomas, 86 Ariz. 161 , 342 P. 2e1 197 (1959); State v.
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powers, have either abandoned Allen entirely or severely limited
its use. Many of these courts favor the standard proposed by the
American Bar Association (ABA), which recommends a fivepart instruction upon which a deadlocked jury may properly
be advised.17 Some courts, although allowing an Allen-type
instruction, do not permit any extensions or alterations, indicating
that the instruction is the farthest limit in verdict-urging language
that they will tolerate. 18
Reviewing courts examine the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the use of the charge and proceed on a case-by-case
basis' 'to determine whether the taint of coercion was present. "19
These courts analyze the content of the instruction for particularly
coercive language,20 the failure to give an instruction balancing
Randall, 137 Mont. 534, 353 P.2d 1054 (1960); Burnette v. State, 280 Md. 88,371
A.2d 663 (1977). It is also improper to give an Allen charge during the penalty
phase of a capital trial. See Rush v. State, 491 A.2d 439 (Del. Super. 1985); Rose
v. State, 425 So. 2d 521 (Fla. Super.), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 909 (1983).
17 This portion of the ABA's recommended instruction reads as follows:
(i) [T]hat in order to return a verdict, each juror must agree thereto;
(ii) [T]hat jurors have a duty to consult with one another and to deliberate with a
view to reaching an agreement, if it can be done without violence to individual
judgment;
(iii) [T]hat each juror must decide the case for himself or herself but only after an
impartial consideration of the evidence with the other jurors;
(iv) [T]hat in the course of deliberations, a juror should not hesitate to reexamine
his or her own views and change an opinion if the juror is convinced it is erroneous;
and
(v) [T]hat no juror should surrender his or her honest conviction as to the weight
or effect of the evidence solely because of the opinion of the other jurors, or for
the mere purpose of returning a verdict.
ABA, StandardsJor Criminal Justice § 15-4.4 (2d ed. 1986).
Several federal and state courts have adopted this standard. See Note, note 3
supra, at 167,171-172 n.35 (1985) (collecting cases).
18 Potterv. United States, 691 F.2d 1275 (8thCir. 1982)(improper"departures"
impose almost impossible task of weighing prejudicial impact of variations); United
States v. Harris, 391 F.2d 348,354 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 874 (1968)
(charge "approaches the limits beyond which a trial court should not venture in
urging a jury to reach a verdict"); Vanderbilt Univ . v. Steely, 566 S.W.2d 853
(Tenn. 1978) (court requires "strict adherence" to its previously mandated charge).
19 Munroe v. United States, 424 F.2d 243, 246 (10th Cir. 1970). See United
States v. Lindell, 881 F.2d 1313, 1321 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct.
1152 (1990).
2U Unitea States v. Porter, 881 F.2d 878,888 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S.
Ct. 348 (1989) (court must scrutinize language of instruction and its incorporation
with other instructions); United States v. Young, 702 F.2d 133 (8th Cir. 1983)
("Allen charges must be utilized with great care and scrutinized carefully"); United
States v. Stewart, 513 F.2d 957 (2d Cir. 1975) (improper use of "cancer" analogy
but not reversible error).
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d.
III

Iii

the interest in agreement with the interest in conscientious decision making, 21 or the speed with which the jury returned its verdict
after having been given the supplemental charge. 22 Remarks
empha ' iz ing the expense and inconvenience of a retrial ,23 or
. ugges ting that the case will have to be retried again24 have been
criticized as il1je ting unfair pre sure on juries.
Some courts recommend that a deadlock-type instruction be
given during the main charge, before the jurors take positions,
at a time when there is not yet a minority to feel pressured, in
order to ameliorate such pressure on minority jurors if a deadlock
should occur. 25 An Allen-type instruction should be given only
when clearly warranted, 26 although there is no absolute right for
counsel to be forewarned before the Allen charge is given. 27
Giving such an instruction to a jury that has not indicated a
deadlock may be reversible error. 28 The failure to object to a
verdict-urging instruction, however, may constitute a waiver of
the claim on appeaP9 or at least diminish the force of the claim
21 United States v. Ronder, 639 F .2d 931 (2d Cir. 1981); People v. Ali, 65
A.D .2d 513 , 514,409 N.Y.S .2d 12 (1978), aff'd, 47 N.Y .2d 920,393 N.E.2d
481,419 N.Y.S .2d 487 (1979) .
21 United Slates v. Webb. 8 16 F.2d 1263 (8th Cir. 1987) (verdict returned fifteen
minutes arrcr receiving deadl ock instru lion); Hodges v. United States, 408 F.2d
543, 554 (8th i r. 1969) Uury c nti nued del iberating for another day before reaching
verdict) ; Will iams v. Uniled Slales, 338 .2d 530 (D .C. Cir. 1964). See also United
States v. U.S . Gypsllm Co . 438 U .S. 422. 462 (1978) .
2J Hodges v. United States, 408 F.2d 543 (8th Cir . 1969); Vanderbilt University
v. Steely, 566 S.W.2d 853 (Tenn. 1978) .
24 United States v. Harris, 391 F .2d 348 (6th Cir.) cert. denied, 393 U .S. 874
(1968); United States v. Smith , 303 F.2d 341, 343 (4th Cir. 1962).
1.' United States v. McKinney, 822 F .2d946 95 1 (10lh Cir. 1987); Uni.tedStates
v. Brown , 634 ".2d 1069 (7th e il'. 1980); United States v. Silvern , 484 F.2d 879
(7th Cir. 1973) . See also People v. Ali , 47 N.Y.2d 920 393 N.E.2d 481 , 419
N.Y.S.2d 487 ( 1979) ( ugg ·ting that supplemental instruction be given during
main charge). The ABA standard a lso recommends that the in truction be given
before the jury retires for deliberalj n. See ABA, note 17 supra, § 15-4.4(a).
26 Sullivan v. United States, 414 F.2d 714, 716 (9th Cir. 1969) .
27 United States v. Rapp, 871 F.2d 957 , 967 (lIth Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct.
233 (1989) .
2B Compare United States v. Contreras, 463 F .2d 773 (9th
ir. 1972) (rever ible
error to give Allen charge to jury without any indication jury deadlocked) with
United States v. Martinez, 446 F .2d 11 8 (2d ir. cerro del/ied, 404 U.S. 944
(1971) (no error to give such charge sua sponte to deliberating jury) and S uza v.
Ellerthorpe, 712 F.2d 1529 (1st Cir. 1983), cen. denied, 464 U.S. 1048 ( 1984)
(setting deadline sua sponte held not coercive) .
29 Golden v. First City Nat 'l Bank, 751 S. W .2d 639 (Tex . Ct. App. 1988). But
see United States v. Webb, 816 F.2d 1263 (8th Cir. 1987) (initial consent to inquiry
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by suggesting that the attorney did not at the time believe that the
jury was being coerced. 30
Threats and Intimidation

As with verdict-urging instructions, a judge must not use
other techniques to pressure a jury to reach a verdict. To be sure,
there is a fine line between permissible encouragement and
impermissible coercion. Nevertheless, despite the judge's desire
for a verdict, he must not fail to advise jurors that they should
adhere to their conscience and free will in making their decision.
Otherwise, legitimate dissenting jurors will feel that they are
somehow responsible for undermining the cause of justice.
Judicial demands for a verdict are ordinarily found coercive
because they impact most heavily upon the recalcitrant jurors,
implying that these jurors are delaying the cause of justice. The
Supreme Court has addressed this problem on several occasions.
In Jenkins v. United States , 3 1 the Court reversed a conviction
when the judge admonished a deadlocked jury: "You have got
to reach a decision in this case. " Although no specific prejudice
was found, inherent prejudice existed based on.the unacceptable
risk that impermissible factors would produce a decision. 32 Similar strident warnings that, in effect, order a jury to agree on a
verdict have been held legally coercive. Thus, statements such
as, "I'm going to get a verdict in this case, " 33 "There has to be
a verdict, ' '34 "You are supposed to find guilt or innocence heredo your job, " 35 or "It is the intention of this court to keep its
jury in session for as long as it may take to arrive at a verdict' '36
have been held impermissibly coercive. Also coercive is openly
telling a jury that the case is a simple one since such a statement
into jury's numerical division did not waive claim as to giving of subsequent Allen
charge) .
30 Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231 , 240 (1988) .
31 380 U.S. 445 , 446 (1965).
n Holbl' ok v. Flynn , 475 U.S. 560, 570 (1976) (the test for inherent prej udice
is " not whetber jurors actu alJy articulated a consciousness of some prej ud i ial
effe t, but ralher whether an unacceptab1e risk is presented of impermis. ible factors
coming into play " ).
33 Ex parte, Morris, 465 So . 2d 1180, 1182 (Ala. 1985).
34 United States v. Assi, 748 F.2d 62 , 68 (2d Cir. 1984).
35 Jackson v. United States, 368 A.2d 1140, 1142 (D.C. 1977) .
36 People v. Carter, 40 N. Y.2d 933,358 N.E.2d 517,389 N.Y.S.2d 835 (1976).
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...

IIII

implies dlat the case warrant only de ultory deliberation and
thereby risks putting undue pressure on legitimate dis entjng
jurors that the judge considers their position untenabJe. TlaIs, a
judge's remarks that h "could have decided this case in ten
minutes' 37 or that 'there shou ld [not] be any great difficulty in
arriving at a verdict in this case' .I~ are intimidating and coercive.
By contrast, remarks that strongly encourage jurors to adhere to
their oaths and try to reach a verdict one way or the other have
been held not coercive when the judge's statements do not appear
to impose on any juror the surrender of her beliefs. 39
A judge must be careful when giving supplemental instructions to avoid singling out individual minority jurors, either
directly or by implication with intimidating remarks that onvey
tile message that they must agre with the majority. -10 When a
judge learns during deliberations of a juror problem that, if
unattended might later require the granting of a mistrial the
judge should immediately intervene to obviate the problem .~ I
This interventi n includes the power to investigate aJIegati ns of
juror misconduct to determine whether cause exists to replace an
offending juror. 42
37 People v. Riley, 70 N.Y.2d 523, 532, 517 N.E.2d 520, 522 N.Y.S.2d 842
(1987).
3' Boyett v. United States, 48 F.2d 482,483 (5th Cir. 1931).
q United States v. Markey, 693 F.2d 594 (6th Cir. 1982) (advising jury that
courthou e would be availab le the followi.ng morning, Christma ' Eve if jury unable
to reach a consen u thal aftemoon not coercive); Williams v. United States 419
F.2d 740 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cerro denied, 409 U.S . 872 (1972) (ordering jury
back to jury room after poll produced confusion among one juror not coercive ;
Richard on v. State, 508 So. 2d 289 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987) (inquiring into
jury 's numerical diviion and di uadlng jury from reviewing certain evidence not
coercive)' People v. Pagan 45 N.Y .2d 725,380 N.B .2d 299,408 N.Y.S.2d 473
(1978) (admonishing jury that case was simple and that they were expected lO arrive
at verdicl not coercive); People v. Sharff, 38 N.Y .2d 75 1, 343 N.E.2d 765 381
N.Y .S.2d 48 (1975) (advising jury that it would be sequestered if it did not reach a
verdict not coercive).
40 Indiana State Highway Comm'n v. Vanderbur 432 N.E .2d 418 (lnd. Ct. App.
1982) deadlock instruction given after identity of recalcitrant jurors known); People
v. Hud on, 104 A.D.2d 157,482 N.Y.S.2d 1009 ( 1984) (judge directs intimidating
remark specifically at two dissenting jurors); People v . Perfetto, 96 A.D .2d 517,
464 N. Y .S.2d 818 (1983) ( inglingoUland confronting \oneminority juror inherently
coercive).
41 People v. Keenan, 46 Cal. 3d 478,758 P.2d 1081,250 Cal. Rptr. 550 (1988)
(juror claimed to be unable to vote for death penalty).
42 People v. Burgener, 41 Cal. 3d 505, 714 P .2d 1251,224 Cal. Rptr. 112 (1986)
(reports that juror was intoxicated on marijuana); People V. McNeal, 90 Cal. App.
3d 830, 153 Cal. Rptr. 706 (1979) (juror indicates personal knowledge of disputed
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Any intervention must be conducted with care, however, so
as to minimize pressure on legitimate minority jurors by advising
them that no verdict is being demanded and that a change in vote
must be a conscientious one. 43 No juror should be induced to
agree to a verdict by fear that a failure to agree will be regarded
as reflecting upon either his intelligence or integrity. 44 Thus, it
was "egregious" for a judge, after learning that a juror was
having difficulty following her oath, to direct an instruction
toward that juror that intimated she was guilty of either perjury
or negligence in her response to questions on voir dire, and that
she was not complying with her oath as a juror. 45 If it becomes
clear that a juror is incapable of fairly reaching a verdict, the
declaration of a mistrial may be in order. 46
Singling out a dissenting juror and engaging in a one-on-one
discussion as to whether the juror is obstructing an agreement on
a verdict is inherently coercive. 47 Threatening the jury with
deliberations for an indefinite period until a lone dissenter capitulates is obviously coercive. 48 A judge acts properly, however,
when he conducts a discrete and nonthreatening investigation to
evaluate a report that a juror may harbor a disqualifying bias or
is otherwise incapable of rendering a verdict. 49
A judge may not place a jury under any explicit time constraints that seek to induce a verdict more swiftly than the ends
of justice will allow. 50 The amount of time that a deliberating
facts).
The broad discretionary authority of a judge to investigate allegations of juror
irregularity during the trial is well settled. See United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S.
522 (1985); Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114 (1983). The procedures adopted,
however, must be protective of a defendant's right to a fair trial and an impartial
jury. United States v. Yonn, 702 F.2d 1341 (1Ith Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 917
(1983); United States v. Dominguez, 615 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1980). A judge also
has the power to dismiss a juror who is "unable or disqualified to perform his
duties." Fed. R. Crim. P. 24(c). See United States v. Rodriguez, 573 F.2d 330
(5th Cir. 1978).
43 United States v. Amaya, 509 F.2d 8, 13 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,429
U.S. 1101 (1977).
44 Jackson v. United States, 368 A.2d 1140,1142 (D.C. App. 1977).
45 [d.
46 [d.
People v. Perfetto, 96 A.D.2d 517,464 N. Y.S.2d 818 (1983).
People v. Carter, 40 N.Y.2d 933,358 N.E.2d 517,389 N.Y.S.2d 835 (1976).
49 People v. Keenan, 46 Cal. 3d 478,758 P.2d 1081,250 Cal. Rptr. 550 (1988).
50 United States v. Diharce-Estrada, 526 F .2d 637, 640 (5th Cir. 1976) ("court's
opening remarks to the jurors emphasizing the dispatch he expected, coupled with
47

48
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jury should be kept together and the determination of whether a
mistrial should be declared if the jury cannot agree are matters
within a judge's sound discretion. 51 Ordinarily, a jury must have
deliberated for an extensive period, and the judge must be
satisfied that agreement is unlikely within a reasonable time
before a judge may discharge thejury.52 Asking ajury to "see if
you can't reach a verdict within an hour" is plainly coercive
because it empbasizes peed over care and infers that the judge
is anxious to oncLude the ase. 53 Less explicit remarks may still
be found coercive if they imply a time frame within which a
verdict is to be reached. 54 Even concern for the jury's well-being
does not justify the judge's placing a time limit on when a verdict
must be reached. S5 A judge faced with emergent circumstances
must explore reasonable alternatives, including the declaration
of a mistrial. Not all time-related remarks, however, are coercive. The test is whether from all the circumstances the judge's
remarks conveyed the impression that it was more important for
the jury to be quick than to be th ughtfu I. SI)
Nor may a judge threaten the jury with equestration express
an intention to confme them indefinitely, r impose unendurable
conditions upon a jury as a mean of pressuring them to reach a
the imm derate treatment accorded defense counsel for his allegedly unju titled
attempts to delay the trial, can on ly be judged by us t have put pressure on the jury
to reach a verdict more swiftly than the ends f justice will allow '); People v.
K eoan, 46 al. 3d 478 758 P.2d 1081, 250 Cal. Rptr. 550( 1988) (judge's remarks
n Friday that h would " appreciate" a verdict on Monday n t c ercive due to
cautionary instructions to minority jurors not t surrender conscientiou Iy held
beliefs).
51People v. Sheldon , 136 A.D.2d 761,523 N.Y.S .2d 220 (l988). Deliberation
tim all wed varies with the length of the trial. An average hung jury deliberales
longer than the average jury that reaches a verdict by a ratio of about three-to-one.
H. Kalven&H. Zeisel, note 2 supra, at 4.59.
52 [d. It should be noted that serious double jeopardy claims would arise if the
judge declares a mistrial prematurely. See Arizona v. Washington, 434 U. S. 497
(1978); Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263 (1892).
53 Burroughs v. United States, 365 F.2d 431, 433 (lOth Cir. 1966).
54 United States v. Amaya , 509 F.2d 8,9 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1101 (1977) (suggesting thntjury try to reach a verdict in one hour, and referring to
previous jury deliberation that lasted nine days, held unduly coercive).
55 Lucas v. American Mfg. Co., 630 F.2d 291,293 (5th Cir. 1980) (advising
jury that due to impending hurricane it must reach verdict within fifteen minutes
was coercive).
56 United States v. Markey, 693 F .2d 594 (6th Cir. 1982); United States v. Green,
523 F.2d 229 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1074 (1976); Butler v. State,
185 Tenn. 686, 207 S.W.2d 584 (1948).
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verdict. 57 Thus, requiring a jury to deliberate for twenty-seven
hours without sleep was found unduly coercive. 58 Similarly
improper was requiring a jury to deliberate until 5:25 A .M.,
notwithstanding their impatience and fatigue. 59 Under appropriate
circumstances, the availability of sequestration at a hotel for the
night may be noted as a possibility, although not as a threat. 60
Threatening to keep the jury" in session" and" incommunicado"
until a verdict is reached is intimidating and coercive,61 as are
threats of sequestration when the judge is aware that some of the
jurors have conflicts with such an arrangement. 62
Problems occasionally arise during the polling of a jury
following the rendition of a verdict. 63 A valid verdict is not
dependent on what a juror agrees to in the jury room but, rather,
on what the juror agrees to when the jury gives its verdict in
open court. 64 A juror has the right when polled to dissent from a
verdict to which he had agreed in the jury room. 65 When this type
j7 Boyett v. United Stales
48 F.2d 482 484 (5th Cir. 193 1) (j udge's remark
sugge. ted that some of jurors derelict in their duty and that judge intended to punjsh
them by keeping tbem confined indefinitely until they reached a verdict). See al 0
United States v. Chaney , 559 F.2d 1094 (71b Cir. 1977)(supplemental cha rge could
have been unders[o d as demanding quick verdict to avoid being locked up for
night).
58 State v. Green, 254 Iowa 1379, 121 N.W.2d 89 (1963).
59 Commonwealth v. Clark, 404 Pa. 143, 170 A.2d 847 (1961) .
6lJ Compare People v. Pagan, 45 N.Y.2d 725, 380 N. E.2d 299, 408 N.Y .S.2d
473 (1978) (appropriate reference to possible sequestration) and People v. Sharff,
38 N.Y.2d 751, 343 N.E.2d 765,381 N.Y.S.2d 48 (1975) ( ame) with People v.
Hudson , 104 A.D .2d 157, 482 N.Y.S .2d 1009 (1984) (threatening jurors with
sequestration because of two recalcitrant jurors).
61 People v. Carter, 40 N.Y.2d 933,358 N.E.2d 517, 389 N.Y.S .2d 835 (1976) .
62 State v. Jones , 292 N.C. 513,234 S.E.2d 555 (1977) (judge knew that some
of jurors had abnormal conflicts and had promised two jurors that court would not
be held over weekend , but nevertheless gratuitously threatened to confine them over
weekend unless they reached verdict).
63 Section 15-4.5 ofthe ABA Standards/or Criminallustiee provides:
When a verdict has been returned and before the jury has dispersed, the jury shall
be polled at the request of any party or upon the court s own motion. The poll
shall be conducted by the court or clerk of COurl asking each juror individually
whether the verdict announced is his or her verdict. If upon the poll there is not
unanimous concurrence, the jury may be directed to retire for further deliberations
or may be discharged.
ABA, note 17 supra , § 15-4.5. See United States v. Fiorilla, 850 F.2d 172 (3d Cir.)
(en bane) (poll not impermissibly coercive), cert. denied , 488 U.S. 966 (1988).
64 Bruce v. Chestnut Farms-Chevy Chase Dairy , 126 F.2d 224,225 (D.C. Cir.
1942).
65 [d. It should be noted, however, that there is no absolute right to have a jury
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of dissent occurs, the jury may be directed to continue their
deliberations, or they may be discharged. 66 If the jury is directed
to continue deliberations, no time limit should be set. 67 Moreover,
it is improper for the judge to interrogate the polled juror, enter
into an argument with that juror, or require an explanation of his
change of position. 6H
When polling reveals the possibility of some irregularity
during the deliberation process, the judge must inquire into the
problem. 69 This inquiry might include questioning the juror
privately about matters not within the deliberative process 70 and
then taking remedial action , such a requiring further deliberations, attempting to dissipate the cause of the problem, replacing
the juror, or declaring a mistrial. 71
Inquiry Into Numerical Division

A judge's inquiry into the numerical division of the jury on
the merits of the verdict may be impermissibly coercive on
dissenting jurors 72 regardless of whether the judge's inquiry
specific:.llly asks the jury which side is favored. In Burton v.
United States, 73 the Supreme Court criticized the practice of
polled. United States v. Shepherd, 576 F.2d 719, 724 (7th CiT.) cert. denied, 439
U.S. 852 (1978). If the request for a poll is not made before the verdict is recorded,
it comes too late . [d. at 724 n.3.
66 United States v. Musto, 540 F. Supp . 318,339 (D.N.J. 1982). Rule 31(d) of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure states:
When a verdict is returned and before it is record d the jury hall b polled at the
request of any party or upon the court's own motion. If upon the poU there is not
unanimous concurrence, the jury may be directed to retire for further deliberations
or may be discharged.
61 State v. Sutton , 31 N .C. App. 697 ,230 S.E.2d 572 (1976) (judge sends jury
back to deliberate and tells them "to tuke n0 more than five minutes to ascertain
whether or not the verdict which you reported yesterday was unanimous").
68 Compare Bruce v. Chestnut Farms-Chevy Chase Dairy, 126 F .2d 224 (D.C .
Cir. 1942) (judge demands explanation for juror's apparent change of position) with
Williams v. United States, 419 F.2d 740 (D.C . Cir. 1969) (judge acts properly to
attempt to clear up confusion from poll).
~. People v. Pickett 61 N.Y.2d 773,461 N.E.2d 294,473 N.Y.S.2d 157 (1984)
(juror responds that verdict was arrived at "under duress ").
'I\J The judge should be carefu I however, not to inquire about matters that occurred
during the deliberation themselves.ld.
11 !d.
12 See Annotation, "Propriety and Prejudicial Effect of Trial Court's Inquiry as
to Numerical Division oOury," 77 A.L.R.3d 769 (1977).
n 196 U.S. 283 (1905).
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making such an inquiry, noting that such questioning serves no
useful purpose, and can be harmful. 74 Later, in Brasfield v.
United States, 75 the Court held that any judicial inquiry into a
deliberating jury's numerical division is per se reversible error.
Brasfield elaborated on the reasons for condemning the practice
of inquiring into a jury's numerical division:
We deem it essential to the fair and impartial conduct of the trial, that
the inquiry itself should be regarded as ground for reversal. Such
procedure serves no useful purpose that cannot be attained by questions
not requiring the jury to reveal the nature or extent of its division. Its
effect upon a divided jury will often depend upon circumstances which
cannot properly be known to the trial judge or to the appellate courts
and may vary widely in different situations, but in general its tendency
is coercive. It can rarely be resorted to without bringing to bear in some
degree, serious although not measurable, an improper influence upon
the jury, from whose deliberations every consideration other than that
of the evidence and the law as expounded in a proper charge, should be
excluded. Such a practice, which is never useful and is generally harmful,
is not to be sanctioned. 76

Brasfield can be understood as a prophylactic rule designed
to protect the jury from the unpredictable effects of both the
inquiry itself and the jury's knowledge of the judge's awareness
of its division. Both can exert subtle pressure on some jurors.
The Brasfield decision reflects a legitimate concern that trial
judges scrupulously refrain from encroaching into the jury's
deliberative process to ensure that the deliberations are candid
and uninhibited. Moreover, when coupled with verdict-urging
instructions, the inquiry can create the impression that the court
agrees with the majority, thereby reinforcing the majority's
determination and melting the resistance of the minority. 77
74 The Court observed: "[W]e do not think that the proper administration of the
law requires such knowledge or permits such a question on the part of the presiding
judge." Id. at 308.
75
272 U.S. 448 (1926).
76 Id. at 450. For other cases condemning the practice, see United States v. Webb,
816 F.2d 1263 (8th Cir. 1987); United States v. Sae-Chua, 725 F.2d 530 (9th Cir.
1984); United States v. Noah, 594 F.2d 1303 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Hayes, 446 F.2d 309 (5th Cir. 1961); United States v. Cook, 254 F.2d 871 (5th
Cir. 1958). See also E. Devitt & C. Blackmar, Federal Jury Practice and Instructions
§ 5.22 (3d ed. 1977) (a "cardinal rule that the court should not ask the jury as to
their numerical division").
77 Smith v. United States, 542 A.2d 823 (D.C. App. 1988) (when jury reveals its
numerical division and judge then gives deadlock instruction, "potential for coercion
is great"); People v. Wilson, 390 Mich. 689, 692, 213 N.W.2d 193, 195 (1973)
(inquiry ordinarily "carries the improper suggestion that the state of numerical
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Although there has been orne disagreement 11\ Brasfield
clearJy was not ba ed on the constitutional dictate of due process
but, rather, rep res nted an exerci e of the Supreme Curt s
supervisory powers over the lower federal courts. 7" Inasmuch as
the decision was not constitutionally grounded state c U1is need
not follow it,8o and federal courts are not required to invoke
its sanction when reviewing state habeas corpus proceedings
alleging a Brasfield violation. 8'
Those state courts that follow the underlying rationale of
Brasfield if not its automatic reversaJ policy, examine whether
the inquiry was unduly coerc ive. These curts make this determination by analyzing the totality of the circum tances. 8Z For
example, repetition of the numerical inquiry aggravate the
impr pIiety. ~l Administering verdict-urging instructions in conjunction with the numerical inquiry, as noted ab ve, exa erbate
the coercive potential by placing undue pressure on min dty
jurors . 8•1 The absen e of ameliorative language is also a relevant
factor. 8s Counsel's reque t for the numerical inquiry however,
can constitute a waiver of the claim. 86
division reflects the stage of the deliberations. It has the doubly coercive effect
of melting the resistance of the minority and freezing the determination of the
majority").
78 See State v. Aragon, 89 N.M. 91,547 P.2d 574 (1976), cert. denied, 89 N.M.
206,549 P.2d 284, and 455 U.S. 845 (1981); People V. Wilson, 390 Mich. 689,
213 N.W.2d 193 (1973).
79 Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U. S. 231, 239-240 (1988).
80 Several state courts see nothing inherently wrong in such an inquiry. See State
v. Morant, 758 S.W.2d 110 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988); People v. Carter, 68 Cal. 2d
810,69 Cal. Rptr. 297, 442 P.2d 353 (1968); Griffin v. State, 2 Ark. App. 145,
617 S.W.2d 21 (1981).
~, Lowcnfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. at 240 n.3. See Locks V. Sumner 703 F.2d
403 (9th Cir.). cerr. denied, 464 U.S. 933 (1983); United States ex ret. Kirk V.
Dire tor, Dep't fCorreclions, 678 F.2d 723 (7th Cir. 1982)' Cornell v. Iowa, 628
F.2d 1044 (8th Cir.), cerro denied, 449 U.S . 1126 (1980); E lli v. Reed, 596 F.2d
1195 (4th CiJ·.), cen. denied, 444 U .S . 973 ( 1979).
82 Richardson v. State, 508 So. 2d 289 (A la. Crim. App . J987); State V. McEntire,
323 S.E.2d 439 (N .C. Ct. App. 1984); People V. Santiago 108 Ill. App. 3d 787,
64 Ill. Dec. 319,439 N.E.2d 984 (1982) ; State v. Roberts , t31 Ariz. 513,642 P.2d
858 (1982).
83 Santiago, 108 III. App. 3d at 787.
84 United States v. Webb, 816 F .2d 1263 (8th Cir. 1987); Smith V. United States,
542 A.2d 823 (D.C. App . 1988); State V. Rickerson, 95 N.M. 666,625 P.2d 1183,
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 845 (1981).
8~ Jackson v. United States, 368 A.2d 1140 (D.C. App. 1977).
86 Marsh V. Cupp, 536 F.2d 1287 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 981 '(1-976) .
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Even unsolicited disclosures to the judge of the jury's division
can be grounds for reversal. 87 A jury note to the judge, for
example, can reveal the jury's division, and even the identity of
the dissenting jurors. 88 Giving a verdict-urging instruction in such
circumstances could reasonably be interpreted as being directed
at the dissenters and thereby be found impermissibly coercive of
these jurors. 89 A judge who learns of the jury's division through
an unsolicited report may in some circumstances be required to
declare a mistrial. 90 Unsolicited disclosures can also result in
reversal when, for example, a judge's inquiry concerning the
jury's request for a review of testimony develops into an inquiry
concerning the jury's division. 91 Such an occurrence can create a
"coercive atmosphere," particularly when the judge singles out
individual jurors for questioning. 92
A judge's inquiry into the jury's numerical split on matters
unrelated to the merits of the verdict is permissible. The Supreme
Court recently addressed this issue in Lowenfield v. Phelps. 93
There, after being advised that the jury was deadlocked, the
judge in open court asked the jurors to write on a piece of paper
his or her name and whether further deliberations would be
helpful in arriving at a verdict. The jurors complied. The count
was eight affirmative votes and four negative votes. After some
confusion, the judge again reiterated the question in slightly
different form, and the jury responded, eleven-to-one, that further deliberations would be helpful. The judge then reinstructed
the jury as to their duty to attempt to reach a verdict.
87 Williams v. United States, 338 F.2d 530 (D.C. Cir. 1964). But see United
States v. Rao, 394 F.2d 354 (2d Cir.) (no error where jury volunteered its division
but did not indicate which side it favored), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 845 (1968);
People v. Sheldon, 136 A.D.2d 761,523 N.Y.S.2d 220 (1988).
It is error for the foreman to reveal the numerical division of the jury. United
States v. Jennings, 471 F.2d 1310 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 935 (1973);
Mullin v. {jnited States, 356 F.2d 368 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Smith v. United States,
542 A.2d 823 (D.C. App. 1988).
88 United States v. Sae-Chua, 725 F.2d 530 (9th Cir. 1984); Jackson v. United
States, 368 A.2d 1140 (D.C. App. 1977).
89 Jackson, 368 A.2d 1140.
90 Id. at 1142.
91 United States v. Akbar, 698 F.2d 378 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 959
(1983).
92 Id. at 380.
93
484 U.S. 231 (1988).

305

CRIMINAL LAW BULLETIN

The Supreme Court approved the judge's inquiry. Distinguishing Brasfield, the Court noted that such an inquiry was
clearly different from an inquiry into the merits because there
was no reason to believe that a juror who was in the minority on
the merits would necessarily conclude that further dehberations
would not be helpful. The Court observed:
We believe the type of question asked by the trial ourl in this case is
exactly what the Court in Brasfield implicitly approved when it tated:
"[An inquiry as to numerical divis ionJ serves no useful purpose that
cannot be attained by questions not requiring the jury to rcveal lhe nature
of its division. "94

Although the supplemental instruction and the return of a verdict
thirty minutes later suggested the 'possibility of coercion, "95
defense counsel's failure to object indicated that • the potential
for coercion now argued was not apparent to one on the spot. "96
Ex Parte Communications

A judge should not communicate with the jury on any matter
pertaining to the case except after giving notice to the parties and
affording them a reasonable opportunity to be present and to be
heard. 97 This rule against ex parte contacts i based on concerns
of orderly trial procedure and ensuring that the jury remains
impartial. Proper procedure requires certain precautions. 9S The
jury 's inquiry should be in writing, the note should be marked as
a court exhibit and read into the record in the presence of cOllnsel
and the parties, counsel should be afforded an opportunity to
suggest appropriate .responses, and the jury should be recalled.
94 [d. at 240. See also Carlton v. United States, 395 F.2d 10 (8th Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1030 (1969).
9S Lowenfeld, 484 U.S. at 240.
96

[d.

91 ABA note 17 supra, § 15-3.7 Gudge .. bouJd not communicate with a juror
or the jury on any aspect f the case itself (as distinguished from matters relating LO
physical comforts and the like), except after notice to all partie and reasonable
opportunity for them to be present'·). See also Annotation, " Propriety aod Prejudicial Effect in Federal Criminal Cases , of Communications Between Judge and Jury
Members Made in the Ab ence of Counsel, Regarding the Ability of Jury Member
to Continue Deliberations," 64 A.L.R. Fed. 874 (1983)' Annotation , "Propriety
and Prejudicial Effect, in Federal Civil Ca es, of Communications Between Judge
and Jury Made Out of Counsel's Pre ence and After Submission for Deliberations "
32 A.L.R. Fed. 392 (1977).
98 United States v. Ronder, 639 F .2d 931 ,934 (2d Cir. 1981).
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The judge should then read into the record the jury's note, and
give the response. 99
The Supreme Court on several occasions has delineated the
permissible scope of ex parte contacts between judge and jury.
In Fillippon v. Albion Vein Slate Co. ,100 a personal injury lawsuit,
the deliberating jury sent a note to the judge asking for further
instructions about the plaintiff's contributory negligence. The
judge sent a written response back to the jury without notifying
the parties and without recalling the jury in open court. Concluding that engaging in this ex parte communication was error, the
Court observed:
We entertain no doubt that the orderly conduct of a trial by jury, essential
to the proper protection of the right to be heard, entitles the parties who
attend for the purpose to be present in person or by counsel at all
proceedings from the time the jury is impaneled until it is discharged
after rendering the verdict. Where a jury has retired to consider its
verdict, and supplementary instructions are required, either because
asked for by the jury or for other reasons, they ought to be given either
in the presence of counselor after notice and an opportunity to be
present; and written instructions ought not to be sent to the jury
without notice to counsel and an opportunity to object. Under ordinary
circumstances, and wherever practicable, the jury ought to be recalled
to the court room, where counsel are entitled to anticipate, and bound to
presume, in the absence of notice to the contrary, that all proceedings in
the trial will be had. In this case the trial court erred in giving a
supplementary instruction to the jury in the absence of the parties and
without affording them an opportunity either to be present or to make
timely objection to the instruction. 101

The Court explicitly found that the supplementary instruction
was harmful since it related to a substantive element in the case,
was legally erroneous, and "was calculated to mislead the
jury. "102
The principle of Fillippon was later applied to a criminal case
in Shields v. United States. 103 There, the judge similarly responded
to a jury note indicating a partial verdict by directing the jury
'19 Occasionally, the personal nature of a note may make it appropriate to forgo
reading it to the entire jury, and recalling the jury into the courtroom may be
unnecessary when the inquiry concerns housekeeping details. Id.
100 250 U.S. 76 (1919).
101 Id. at 8l.
102 Id. at 82.
103

273 U.S. 583 (1927).
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to continue deliberations on the remaining defendants. This
communication was not made in open court, and neither the
defendants nor their attorneys were present or advised of these
interchanges. The Court reversed the conviction without finding
any specific prejudice. It noted that' 'the rule of orderly conduct
of jury trial entitl[es] the defendant, especially in a criminal case,
to be present from the time the jury is impaneled until its
discharge after rendering the verdict. ' , 104
The Fillippon-Shields principle was reaffirmed in Rogers v.
United States. 105 There, in response to a jury note inquiring
whether the judge would accept a guilty verdict with "extreme
mercy of the Court," the judge instructed the bailiff' 'to advise
the jury that the Court's answer was in the affirmative." 106 These
communications were in private, without notice to defendant or
an opportunity for counsel to respond. Pointing out that Rule 43
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure guarantees a defendant the right to be present "at every stage of the trial including
the impaneling of the jury and the return of the verdict," the
Court held that the jury's message should have been answered in
open court and that defendant's counsel should have been given
an opportunity to be heard before the judge responded. 107
Although the Court agreed that a violation of Rule 43 could
be harmless, such a conclusion was not warranted here, since
the violation was' 'fraught with potential prejudice. ' , 108 The Court
explained that the judge should not have indicated a willingness
to accept the jury's request. Rather, the judge should have
advised the jury that its request would not be binding on the court
and that, in any event, the jury had no sentencing function and
was required to reach its verdict without regard to sentence.
Moreover, the jury returned its verdict within five minutes of
receiving the judge's response, a circumstance that "strongly
suggests that the trialjudge's response may have induced unanimity by giving members of the jury who had previously hesitated
about reaching a guilty verdict the impression that the recommendation might be an acceptable compromise. ' '109
104

105
106
107

108
109

Id. at 588-589.
422 U.S. 35 (1975) .
Id. at 36 .
Id. at 39 .
Id. at 41.
Id. at 40.
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The requirement and extent of the prejudice that needs to be
shown from a judge's ex parte contacts with a deliberating jury
was further examined in United States v. U. S. Gypsum Co. 110
There, during extensive deliberations, the foreman asked to
confer with the judge about the condition of the jury. Defense
counsel agreed to the judge's proposed ex parte conference. At
the meeting, the foreman advised the judge of the deteriorating
state of health of the jurors after the lengthy trial and twice
indicated that the jury was deadlocked. Near the close of the
meeting, the following colloquy took place: III
The Court: I would like to ask the jurors to continue their deliberations
and I will take into consideration what you have told me. That is all I
can say.
Mr. Russell (foreman): I appreciate it. It is a situation I don't know how
to help you get what you are after.
The Court: Oh, I am not after anything.
Mr. Russell: You are after a verdict one way or the other.
The Court: Which way it goes doesn't make any difference to me.

The judge informed counsel of the substance of the meeting but
omitted reference to the foreman's opinion that the jury was
deadlocked and to the foreman's impression that the judge wanted
a definite verdict.
The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, finding that
the judge's ex parte communications with the jury foreman
encroached on the jury's authority and foreclosed a possible' 'no
verdict" outcome by giving the foreman the impression that the
judge wanted a verdict. The event was "disturbing" for several
reasons. First, just as "any ex parte meeting . . . is pregnant
with possibilities for error, " the instant case amply demonstrated
the' 'pitfalls inherent in such an enterprise. "112 Moreover, "unexpected questions or comments can generate unintended and
misleading impressions of the judge's subjective personal views
which have no place in his instruction to the jury-all the more
so when counsel are not present to challenge the statements. "113
Second, any ex parte communication to the jury through one
110
III
112

113

438 U.S. 422 (1978) .
[d. at 432.
[d. at 460.
[d. at 461.

309

CRIMINAL LAW BULLETIN

member of the panel risks innocent misstatements of law and
misinterpretations whose content cannot be determined. 114 Third,
the absence of counsel from the meeting and the unavailability
of a transcript aggravate the problems of having one juror serve
as a conduit for communicating instructions to the whole panel. 115
The Court concluded:
Thus, it is not simply the action of the judge in having the private meeting
with the jury foreman, standing alone-undesirable as that procedure
is-which constitutes the error; rather, it is the fact that the ex parte
discussion was inadvertently allowed to drift into what amounted to a
supplemental instruction to the foreman relating to the jury 's obligation
to return a verdict, coupled with the fact that counsel were denied any
chance to correct whatever mistaken impression the foreman might have
taken from this conversation, that we find most troubling. 11 6

Although no actual prejudice was found, the Court, citing
Jenkins v. United States, 117 determined that inherent prejudice
was shown by the jury's swift return of a verdict following the
ex parte meeting, thereby suggesting a "risk" that the foreman
believed that the judge wanted a verdict and then conveyed that
impression to the jury. 118
Id.
115Id.
114

116

Id. at 462 .

117

380 U .S. 445 (1965).
118 Id. at 462 . The Supreme Court has addressed issues involving ex parte contacts
between the trial judge and a jur r during the trial in two recent decision .
In Rushen v . Spain, 464 U.S. 114 (1983), the Court held in a pel' curiam opinion
that the judge's private unrecorded meeting with a juror concerning her fear that
cel1ain ev.iden e might up et her. even if a constitutional error, wa hamlless. This
"innocuous " meeting did not include di cuss ion of any factual or legal matters
pertaining to the case and the jury ' s deliberations were not found to have been
biased . Although' ' the right to personal presence at alJ critjcal stages of the trial and
the right to counsel are fundamental rights of each crimjnal defendant, the ' dayto-day realities of courtroom life" also bave to be considered . [d. at 117- 119.
"There is scarcely a lengthy trial in which one or mol' juror do not have occasion
to speak to the trial judge ~Ibout something, whether it relates to a matter of personal
comfort or to ' orne a pect of the trial. " [d. at 118. The Court empha ized that e
parte contacts could be of serious concern, and that convictions should be overturned
when prejudice i shown .
In United Stares v. Gagn n, 470 U.S . 522 1985) the judge held an ex parte
meeting with njuror who was concerned about the defendant's sketching her p rtrait.
Defendant 'S counsel wa pre en[ at the meeting and did n t object. CiLing Rushell
the Court in a per curiam opinion held that the mere occurrence of an ex parle
conversation between judge and juror in the absence of the defendant did not deprive
the defendant of any con ' titutional right. The encounter was a "short interLude in a
complex trial" and "was not the sort of event which every defendant had a right
personally to attend under the Fifth Amendment. " Id. at 527. The Court noted that
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Federal and state appellate courts ordinarily review ex parte
communications according to the nature of the communication
(i.e., whether it related to a substantive issue in the case or
whether it concerned nonsubstantive matters). 119 Substantive
communications would include communications pertaining to
legal and factual issues in the case, whereas nonsubstantive
communications relate to the extent of deliberations, the availability of items of evidence, and housekeeping matters, such as
meal orders. The courts also examine the manner in which the
communication was made and ordinarily apply waiver doctrine
when counsel fails to protest the occurrence. The most decisive
factor, as the Supreme Court decisions demonstrate, is the
potential for prejudice, or the presence or absence of actual
prejudice, from the communication.
The courts scrutinize more closely ex parte communications
that relate to legal or factual matters in the case since such
communications can carry a presumption of prejudice in favor
of the aggrieved party. 120 Thus, ex parte responses to a jury's
question about substantive matters, such as (1) the standard for
contributory negligence; 121 (2) the measure of damages under a
contract; 122 (3) principles of estoppel; 123 (4) construction of a
contract; 124 (5) interpretation of a criminal statute; 125 (6) the need
for unanimity for a verdict; 126 (7) separability of substantive
defendants could have done nothing at the conference, and, indeed, their presence
might have been counterproductive. The Court also held that counsel's failure to
object to defendants' presence constituted a waiver of defendant's statutory right of
presence under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 43. [d.
See also United States v. Madrid, 842 F.2d 1090 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 488
U.S. 912 (1988); United States v. Yonn, 702 F.2d 1341 (11th Cir.) cert. denied,
464 U.S. 917 (1983); LaChappelle v. Moran, 699 F.2d 560 (1st Cir. 1983); People
v. Mullen, 44 N.Y.2d 1, 374 N.E.2d 369,403 N.Y.S.2d 470 (1978).
119 United States v. Rapp, 871 F.2d 957 (1Ith Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 233
(1989); People v. France, 436 Mich. 138,461 N.W.2d 621 (1990).
120 Wallace v. Duckworth, 597 F. Supp. 1,2 (N.D. Ind. 1983); France, 436
Mich. at 139, 461 N.W.2d at 622.
121 Fillippon v. Albion Vein Slate Co., 250 U.S. 76 (1919).
122 Nations v. Sun Oil Co., 695 F.2d 933 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 893
(1983).
123 South Leasing v. Williams, 778 F.2d 704 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S.
1039 (1985).
124 Vogel v. American Warranty Home Servo Corp., 695 F.2d 877 (5th Cir.
1983).
125 Collins v. State, 191 Ga. App. 289, 381 S.E.2d 430 (1989).
126 Henry v. State, 548 So.2d 570 (Ala. 1989).
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offenses from conspiracy; 127 (8) the overt act requirement for
conspiracy; m and (9) any jury polling following the verdict, 129
were found prejudicial and required reversal. Similarly, ex parte
communications on nonsubstantive matters, such as responding
to a jury note inquiring whether the judge would accept a
particular verdict,130 or urging a deadl cked jury to continue
deliberating, 131 can also result in reversal. The courts disapprove
of a per se rule f reversal lJ2 and analyze the ex parte communication for actual or potential prejudice. 133 Cases finding lack of
prejudice look at the sub tance of the communicati n 134 the
re pOl1sivene s of the judge's communication to the jury's communication IJS the xtent of the deliberations after the ex parte
communication,136 and any curative instructions given to the
jury. 137
Apart from the substance and timing of the ex parte communication, some courts find that the error has been aggravated by
United States v. Ronder, 639 F.2d 931 (2d Cir. 1981).
128 United States v. Burns, 683 F.2d 1056 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1173
(1982).
129 Rhodes v. State, 547 So . 2d 1201 (Fla. 1989).
130 Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S. 35 (1975).
13 1 Shields v. United States, 273 U.S. 583 (1927); United States v. Ronder, 639
F.2d 931 (2d Cir. 1981); People v. Ciaccio, 47 N.Y.2d 431,391 N.E.2d 1347,418
N.Y .S.2d 371 (1979); People v. Payne, 149 A.D.2d 542,540 N.Y .S.2d 256 (1989) .
132 People v. France, 436 Mich. 138,461 N.W.2d 621 (1990).
133 United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978); United States v.
Widgery, 778 F.2d 325 (7th Cir. 1985); United States, ex rei. SEC v. Billingsley,
766 F.2d 1015 (7th Cir. 1985); Krische v. Smith, 662 F.2d 177 (2d Cir. 1981).
1}oI Smith v. Kel..o , 863 F.2d 1564 (lith Cir.), cere. denied. 490 U.S . J072
(1989) ; United State. v. Blackmon . 839 F.2d 900 (2d Cir. 1988); United States v.
Bustamante, 805 P.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1986)' United Stales . Widgery , 778 '. 2d 325
(7th Cir. 1985) ' Skill v. Martinez, 671 F .2d 368 (3d Cir. 1982); People v. Aveille
148 A.D. 2d 461 538 N.Y.S.2d 615 (989) ; People v. Moran . 123 A.D.2d 646,
507 N.Y.S.2d 24 (1986).
135 United States v. Rapp, 871 F.2d 957 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 233
(1989); United States v. Breedlove, 576 F .2d 57 (5th Cir. 1978); Watson v. State,
728 S.W.2d 109 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987).
1.10
ompare United States v. RondeI' , 639 F .2d 93 1 (2d ir. 1981) (verdi t
reached one-balf hour after improper communication) with Krische v. Smith. 662
F. 2d 177(2<:1 il'. 1 81)(verdictreachedone hou:randtwentyminutesal'terimproper
communication) and United States v. Rapp 87J F .2d 957 (11th Cir.) (verdict
reached lwenty- even hours after improper communication) , cerl. d 'flied I J0 S.
Ct. 233 (1989).
131 United States v. Bascaro, 742 F.2d 1335 (llth Cir. 1984); United States v.
Musto, 540 F. Supp. 318 (D.N.J. 1982).
127
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the manner in which the communication was made. The absence
of the judge when a jury inquiry is received and answered can be
error. It is improper, for example, for a judge to communicate
with the jury through court personnel. 138 Telephonic communications with the jury is also improper, 139 as is the judge's personally
entering the jury toom to answer the jury's questions. 140
A claim that the judge engaged in an improper ex parte
communication can be waived. 141 Counsel's voluntary absence
from the courtroom may operate as a waiver, 142 as well as
counsel's express consent to the judge engaging in an ex parte
meeting. 143 The failure to interpose a timely objection and seek
corrective action can also constitute a waiver. 144 A defendant also
may waive his right to be present at a conference between
judge and jury when he knowingly absents himself from the
proceeding. '45 Where a statute or rule expressly commands the
defendant's presence, however, counsel's consent to the defendant's absence ordinarily will not operate as a waiver. 146
Conclusion

The integrity of the jury deliberation process must not be
infringed by a judge's improper verdict-urging instructions,
coercive remarks, or private contacts with deliberating jurors.
138 People v. Ciaccio, 47 N.Y.2d 431, 391 N.E.2d 1347, 418 N.Y.S.2d 371
(1979); People v. Miller, 149 A.D.2d 439, 539 N.Y.S.2d 782 (1989). See also
Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363 (1966) (court bailiff's improper communication
with jury deprived defendant of constitutional right to be tried by impartial jury).
139 Ortiz v. State, 543 So. 2d 377 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
140 State v. Estrada, 69 Haw. 204, 738 P.2d 812 (1987).
141 United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 527 (1985).
142 Karl v. Burlington N.R.R. Co., 880 F.2d 68 (8th Cir. 1989).
143 United States v. Musto, 540 F. Supp. 318, 335 (D.N.J. 1982).
144 United States v. Bascaro, 742 F~2d 1335 (lith Cir. 1984). In re Air Crash
Disaster, 586 F. Supp. 711, 721 (E.D. Pa. 1984), rev'd, 769 F.2d 115 (1985), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 994 (1988); Watson v. State, 728 S.W.2d 109 (Tex. Ct. App.
1987).
145 United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 529. This situation assumes that the
conference involves a material part of the trial at which defendant's presence would
be meaningful. People v. Mullen, 44 N.Y.2d 1, 374 N:E.2d 369, 403 N.Y.S.2d
470 (1978) (defendant's absence from informal questioning of juror in judge's
chambers for possible disqualification not violative of defendant's right to be
present).
146 People v. Mehmedi, 69 N.Y.2d 759,505 N.E.2d 610, 513 N.Y.S.2d 100
(1987).
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Appellate courts carefully scrutinize deadlock instructions to
determine whether the content or timing of the instructions
was coercive. The courts also examine whether other coercive
language might have induced a verdict that was the product not
of conscienti us agreement on the merits but, rath r, that resulted
from the pressure f time constraint and ntinued c nfinement.
Although the standards are n t uniform , federal and tate appellate COUlts generally examine the judge-jury interaction on a
case-by-case basi under the t tality of the ircumstances to
determine whether there existed actual prejudice or a dear
potential for prejudice.
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